Exhibit E

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1	APPEARANCES: (Cont'd)	
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	1	(The following telephonic proceedings were hold
		(The following telephonic proceedings were held
	2	remotely:)
	3	COURTROOM DEPUTY: Case Number 17 CV 8696, Fulton
	4	versus Foley; and Case Number 18 CV 998, Coleman versus City
10:35AM	5	of Chicago.
	6	THE COURT: Okay. Good morning, everyone. For the
	7	record, this is Judge Harjani speaking. Can I have your
	8	appearances please starting with plaintiffs' counsel?
	9	MR. CURRAN: Good morning, your Honor. Nicholas
10:35AM	10	MR. AINSWORTH: Go ahead.
	11	MR. CURRAN: Sorry, Russell.
	12	MR. AINSWORTH: Go ahead, Nic.
	13	MR. CURRAN: This is Nicholas Curran on behalf of
	14	Plaintiff Fulton.
10:35AM	15	MR. AINSWORTH: And this is Russell Ainsworth
	16	appearing on behalf of Mr. Coleman.
	17	THE COURT: Okay. Good morning. And then for
	18	defendants taking as always, taking one by one generally
	19	the order as listed in the complaint if you remember that.
10:35AM	20	Go ahead.
	21	MR. MORAN: Good morning, Judge. This is Pat
	22	Moran. I represent the police officer defendants in both
	23	lawsuits.
	24	MR. GRILL: Good morning, your Honor. This is
10:35AM	25	Andrew Grill. I, along with Mr. Moran, represent the police

officer defendants in both lawsuits as well. 1 2 MS. MEADOR: Good morning, your Honor. This is 3 Lisa Meador -- with me is Sara Schroeder -- on behalf of the 4 City of Chicago. MS. KUNZER: Good morning, your Honor. This is Amy 5 10:36AM 6 I'm representing the County and Harold Garfinkel. Kunzer. 7 MR. HENRETTY: Good morning, your Honor. This is 8 Lyle Henretty and we have Jessica Scheller here for the 9 Respondents. 10 THE COURT: Okay. That sounds like that's 10:36AM 11 everybody. Okay. Thank you for your time. 12 We're here today for me to give you a ruling on the 13 motion that is pending before me, which is the Motion to 14 Quash the deposition subpoena of Eric Sussman and essentially through the briefing to also include Mark Rotert and I've 15 10:36AM 16 reviewed the motion, which was filed -- it has Docket Number 17 238. I reviewed the -- all the responses that were submitted 18 and the reply brief and the surreply brief that has been 19 submitted along with the affidavit of Jessica Scheller. 20 Okay. And I'll give you my ruling. 10:37AM 21 Any updates, though, on this matter before I give 22 you my ruling, plaintiffs' counsels? 23 MR. CURRAN: This is Nicholas --24 MR. AINSWORTH: Nothing to update. 25 THE COURT: Mr. Ainsworth, nothing -- I think you 10:37AM

Court finds as follows: information.

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All right. The Court has considered, as mentioned, all of the issues along with the briefing as well as the arguments of the parties on this Motion to Quash and the

First, the information that the defendants seek from Mr. Sussman and Mr. Rotert constitutes relevant It is anticipated that the plaintiffs will seek to introduce the Certificate of Innocence as well as the fact that the Cook County State's Attorney's Office first decided to ask for a retrial and then decided to dismiss the charges and to use those various positions and the Certificate to argue that it is indicative of innocence. And, indeed, the Seventh Circuit in the *Patrick* case affirmed the introduction of that evidence recently. Certainly there were some bases in there for the defendants to argue that it shouldn't be admitted, nevertheless the Court must anticipate that the District Court may very well introduce this evidence, both the Certificate of Innocence, along with the various positions by the State's Attorney's Office.

And in particular, the Court sees the way it was used in prior cases, particularly the *Harris* case. In *Harris* v. City of Chicago, the court notes that it was -plaintiffs' counsel used these pieces of evidence to argue the fact of innocence and also argued that the State's Attorney's Office could have opposed the motion to dismiss

and chose not to as indicative of innocence; and that Harris case is that 2018 WL 2183992.

And so while the Certificate of Innocence in particular the Court understands does not have res judicata effect under Illinois law and even though there is some language in the Certificate of Innocence demonstrating that it is not a concession by the SA, the State's Attorney, that the defendant is innocent, nevertheless the -- these pieces of evidence the Court has to assume that plaintiffs may try to use that as indicative of evidence -- of innocence at trial and that it is relevant for the defendants to then explore rebuttal evidence designed to show or argue that these decisions by the State's Attorney and the Certificate of Innocence is not automatically indicative of innocence, that just because these decisions were made does not mean that the defendant -- that the plaintiffs are innocent.

So this is an issue that will likely occur at It is for the jury to give weight and decide whether or not these decisions are able to allow for that inference of innocence or not and I understand that courts oftentimes provide limiting jury instructions on this matter. But, nevertheless, the relevance here is what is significant and the relevance is to allow defendants the opportunity in discovery to explore evidence designed to rebut that potential inference of innocence and the arguments associated

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The -- moreover, there's at least factors before me that demonstrates that the defendants' arguments may have merit and are worthy of exploration in discovery. State's Attorney's belief does not equate the issuance of a Certificate of Innocence as indicative of innocence and talks about how there's more to the story. There are factors besides actual instances that are considered and that's evident from the various needed interviews given by Mr. Rotert and discussions publicly about what goes into consideration, including statements made in court, at the time certain decisions are not opposed or made.

And so the Court finds that -- and essentially the affidavit of Ms. Scheller gives some light that there are decisions besides actual innocence that go into the calculus. This does not seem to be an issue of dispute and so in that there is relevance here to that exploration.

And while the Court understands the Respondents have argued that it is the state court judge that decides whether or not to grant the Certificate of Innocence, it is still important that the State's Attorney's Office does not object. This is an adversarial proceeding; and with an objection, it likely there would be a hearing. With no adversarial proceeding and a non-objection or taking no position, it is likely that the Certificate of Innocence will be granted and that's what happened here.

So while the Court understands that the State's Attorney's Office might have a final say in the matter, it is still an important part of the process. And why the State's Attorney's Office chose not to object is important to rebut arguments made by the plaintiff at trial because it is a significant factor in the granting of the Certificate of Innocence.

So overall, the first consideration here is whether or not the information is relevant; and for the reasons the Court has just discussed, the Court finds that the relevancy basis is met.

Second, the issue is whether or not Mr. Sussman and Mr. Rotert are the right individuals and the Court finds they are for purposes of deposition. They were personally involved in the decisions here, there's really no dispute about that, and they will have relevant information to share. And while the State's Attorney's Office offered a compromise Rule 30(b)(6) witness, that offer was rejected and the Court suggested a compromise but that was not accepted and, of course, the defendants are not obligated to accept a compromise and what the deposition subpoena was for Sussman and Rotert and then the Court will accordingly rule on the motion as it stands. And all that's required under the Federal Rules is that individuals who are noticed, to the

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extent they meet issues of relevance and proportionality, may have personal knowledge about the issue at hand. And in this case, Sussman and Rotert both have personal knowledge about the issues that we are discussing and therefore the -- their witnesses are appropriate for purposes of deposition on these issues.

Third, the Court finds that the Apex Doctrine does not bar the testimony of Mr. Sussman and Rotert. Both are no longer at the State's Attorney's Office. They are no longer sen -- no longer at senior government-level positions. So the com -- the issues that are commonly discussed by the Apex Doctrine, such as the responsibilities of senior-level officials and their time commitments associated with those positions in not having to be distracted or not having to be pulled away from their official duties by constantly giving depositions, those factors the Court finds are not relevant They are both out of senior-level government positions at this time and the Court also notes that they recently testified in the *Brown* case on several topics and the Apex Doctrine certainly did not bar their testimony in that case. And in addition for purposes of current circumstances, they are -- their depositions will be done remotely and that also will minimize the time associated and the -- with taking these depositions.

Fourth, the key issue here that has been raised by

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the parties is the issue of the deliberative process privilege and the work product privileges and as it relates to Sussman and Rotert because, of course, they were engaged in internal deliberations about whether to seek a new trial, whether to dismiss the charges, and whether or not to oppose the Certificate of Innocence. And it's clear to the Court from reading the briefs that the defendants seek to inquire as to the reasons for those actions and that implicates the deliberative process and work product privileges.

At the outset, the Court finds that the affidavits submitted by the Respondents provides a reasonable and sufficient basis to invoke the privilege. The affidavits certainly could have been better; and I recognize the defendants' arguments on that matter. There is certainly more than just facts in there. There is some argument in that affidavit which is not appropriate for purposes of an affidavit. However, the affidavit combined with multiple representations by the Respondents in its brief and during several discussions on this motion with the Court, the Court finds it's sufficient to invoke preliminarily the deliberative process and work product privileges on this issue.

The next issue for the Court to consider is whether or not the issues -- again, when I say "these issues," I'm talking about the motion to seek a retrial and then to

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dismiss and then a Certificate of Innocence do not oppose it. The respond -- the defendants argue that these issues here are post-decisional but the Court finds that that is not the case and that the inquiry that the defendants seek here are pre-decisional.

The final decision, if you will, here publicly was made to dismiss the case and then to not oppose the Certificate of Innocence. Those are the final decisions of the agency. The reasons for it are pre-decisional. They are not necessarily publicly made in court. They are, therefore, not part of the final decision that was made by the agency. The final decision is to not oppose to seek new trial, to seek a dismiss and therefore the -- what defendants really seek is the rationale of logic behind these ultimate and final decisions. And so the Court finds that the rationale, if you will, is pre-decisional.

And the Court is guided by many of the cases associated with deciding this issue, particularly on the Saunders case versus City of Chicago and the Allen versus Chicago Transit Authority case that discusses the doctrine of deliberative process privilege.

Next, the Court considers the various factors discussed of the privileges and finds that the defendants cannot so easily pierce the privilege, if you will, because there is other evidence that can address the issue of whether

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these decisions equate to a decision on innocence. That is, even though these privileges are not absolute, the Courts do consider whether or not other evidence can suffice in allowing the issue to be explored and the Court finds that it can; and I'll explain that in a minute.

The issue, however, here is whether or not the depositions can be fully quashed completely as a result of the invocation of the privilege and the Court finds that that cannot be the case. As with any privilege, there must be a question-by-question or topic-by-topic analysis or, in a case of a document, a document-by-document analysis as to whether the information that item is privileged or not. It's much like documents are used for privilege, one cannot say that everything a witness has to testify about in the universe of his knowledge is privileged. There must be a more particular inquiry. And here, that is particularly important because there are topics that have been waived, number one; and, number two, there are topics that are outside the relevant privileges.

The topic first concerning the reasons the Respondents moved for a retrial and then moved to dismiss have been waived. There have been several public discussions of the issue by both Mr. Sussman and Mr. Rotert and by State's Attorney Kim Foxx. In particular, Mr. Rotert gave a lengthy interview where he discussed some of his rationale

for the positions that were taken by the State's Attorney. Mr. Sussman made some brief statements on the issues regarding new DNA evidence. And so there are public statements out there as to the reasons why the State's Attorney's sought first a retrial and then sought to dismiss. And while those public statements may not have included all the reasons, the Court finds that these statements made publicly are sufficient to constitute a waiver as to the reasons for the decision for a retrial and then dismissal of the conviction in this case. And the Court is informed by the decision by Judge Valdez in the *Hood* case regarding Governor Quinn and much of the same factors that played into that decision are present here.

There was some argument in the briefings that the disclosure of witness interviews may constitute a waiver -- regarding the reinvestigation constitutes a waiver and the Court does not find that persuasive. Witness interviews primarily contain factual materials, factual information about what witnesses have said and, of course, facts are not protected by the privilege; only the internal deliberations and the work product are protected. Of course anything that a lawyer writes down the Court understands somehow does implicitly, you know, involves some degree of a mental impression but generally factual information taken down by lawyers about a witness interview is primarily fact-related

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and so the Court finds that just because witness interviews were produced doesn't mean there's a waiver; nevertheless, the public interviews by the various officials I mentioned is the basis for finding a waiver on the issue of the motion to retry and then the motion to dismiss.

The second big topic is concerning the Certificate of Innocence and the Court finds that that -- the privileges associated with that have not been waived. There has been no similar public statements that have been made. The internal deliberations regarding the decision to not oppose the Certificate of Innocence has not been revealed publicly and thus the privileges are maintained as to the reasons why the Certificate of Innocence was not opposed in this case.

Finally, there are topics that you may have discussed during a deposition here that will allow the defendants to challenge the eventual arguments expected from the plaintiffs that these decisions are indicative of innocence while still maintaining the privilege so the right result here is somewhere in between the two positions. It is not to disregard or find the privilege inapplicable as the defendants may seek, nor is a full quash of the subpoenas at the outset as Respondents seek. Rule 26, along with the Court's inherent authority to manage discovery, allows the Court to limit discovery to the extent necessary to effectuate Rule 1's purposes.

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And so these are the topics the Court will permit at the deposition of Sussman and Rotert in line with the decision the Court has made today. And, of course, I know you'll order this transcript so it will be clear to you when you order it and get it but here they are, nevertheless.

Number one, the policies and procedures followed during the reinvestigation by the Conviction Integrity Unit as well as any policies and procedures followed with respect to the Certificate of Innocence, okay. These policies and procedures are the general policy and procedures that the State's Attorney's Office follows -- if there are any, if they indeed do exist -- with regard to the decision to not retry, to dismiss, and to not oppose the Certificate of They do not necessarily -- because they're Innocence. policies and procedures, they don't necessarily apply to this case as well. They are the general policy and procedures and the Court finds that's -- that's relevant because it is important to give context to the ultimate decision that was made to allow the jury to understand what policies and procedures exist and how the decision is made by the State's Attorneys Office about these issues.

The second topic the Court will allow is whether those policies and procedures were followed in this case on both the issues. They both made the decision to retry/dismiss, which I often lump into one, and the decision

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on the Certificate of Innocence. So this doesn't mean that you get to explore the underlying reasons -- I'll get to that in a moment -- but it's just a question of whether or not the general policies and procedures were followed in this case, if they even exist. And those are relevant again to support the parties' various arguments that there was a process for the reinvestigation into decisions and to give context and legitimacy to the ultimate decision made by the State's Attorney's Office so that both sides can argue the facts in their own way for their own purposes.

The third topic the Court will allow will be the nature and sources of materials reviewed during the investigation on both issues. Again, both have the decision of retry/dismiss as well as a Certificate of Innocence.

These are just discussing the nature and source of materials. They're not -- they are not -- they are not invading the deliberative process privilege or the work product privileges so testimony such as reconsidered the witness interviews, reconsidered DNA evidence, things like that, are going to give context to the ultimate decision that is -- that was made by the State's Attorney's Office.

With respect to topic four, which is the motion to retry and then to dismiss, the Court has already stated that the -- it finds that the privileges have been waived on this topic and so the Respondents -- excuse me, the defendants can

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inquire as to the decisions -- to the reasons why the State's Attorney decided to first retry and then dismiss the case against the plaintiffs.

Okay. Five, the Court will allow testimony about the general factors considered by the State's Attorney's Office in evaluating generally whether to oppose or not oppose a Certificate of Innocence without consideration of this particular case. The Court has found that the deliberative process privilege does apply and the work product relationship does still apply with respect to the Certificate of Innocence and therefore the defendants cannot explore the exact reasons in this case for why the Certificate of Innocence was not opposed.

However, the general factors considered, the Court finds, in all cases does not invade the deliberative process privilege or the work project -- the work product privileges. Indeed, in the affidavit of Jessica Scheller, she has already disclosed that there are other factors beyond the issue of innocence in making the decision. In fact, I think she said "the CCSAO decides not to intervene on Certificates of Innocence for many reasons oftentimes based on procedural, collateral, or evidentiary flaws unrelated to the CCSAO's belief in whether the individual is guilty of the charged crimes."

And so the Court finds that the general factors

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that are considered by the State's Attorney's Office don't invade the pre-decisional discussions and frankly are already talked about by the State's Attorney's Office in this filing. And beyond that, this general factors the Court believes will give the defendants enough to counter arguments that the Certificate of Innocence is representative of innocence. While they will not know the exact reasons for this case why the Certificate of Innocence was not opposed because of the privilege, the Court finds the general factors will be enough to make the argument and to allow the jury to make various inferences from the arguments that are made by counsel.

Topic six will be allowed is the statements made by counsel for the plaintiffs to the State's Attorney's Office, to Sussman and Rotert, during the investigation, decision on retrial, dismissal, or Certificate of Innocence. Third-party comments, of course, by counsel for plaintiffs are not subject to the privilege. They're not internal deliberations by the State's Attorney's Office and the Court finds that these statements might -- might in some way provide some helpful information with respect to the defendants' argument about innocence versus non-innocence for these decisions.

And seven, the Court finds that statements to the press on these issues are not subject to the privilege, of course, if made publicly; and again, they may contain relevant details or reasons for this decision. Of course,

the Court is not in any way discussing admissibility here. Relevancy is broader than admissibility. Discovery can take you to count things that do not -- are not ultimately admissible. But for purposes of discovery, the Court finds that there's a sufficient basis to allow this inquiry given what has happened in past cases and given what the plaintiff potentially seeks to do here.

So just to make -- one more time, generally the topics that the Court has provided, which is our seven topics, are generally not covered by the deliberative process or work product privileges except for number four, which is the decision to retry and then to dismiss. That topic, the Court has found, has been waived as a result of the public discussion of the issue.

And in making this decision, the Court has formed and -- informed and finds persuasive the reasoning of Chief Judge Pallmeyer in the *Brown* case, which employed a similar analysis as this Court, involving the same two witnesses and involving essentially identical issues. And while the Court's decision may differ here and there from what Judge Pallmeyer's reasoning is, nevertheless the Court has found persuasive the majority of what Judge Pallmeyer discussed in her ruling on the *Brown* case. And so that is the decision of the Court.

The Motion to Quash, which is Docket Number 238, is

denied and -- however, the Court has -- in evaluating this 1 2 3 4 Court. 5 11:06AM 6 So the question that we have is when these 7 8 9 10 11:06AM 11 12 13 14 15 well. 11:07AM 16 17 18 19 20 11:07AM 21 ask. 22 23 24 25 11:07AM

issue has placed various limitations on the deposition of Mr. Sussman and Mr. Rotert as I just discussed in allowing these depositions to go forward and that is the ruling of the

depositions can get done. So I'll allow Respondents to go since you're producing the witnesses. I'm, of course, sensitive to the fact that the holiday is coming up and you are a third party not involved in this litigation but, nevertheless, I do want to try to get this done fairly soon because we are essentially at the end of discovery.

So, Respondents, give me some thoughts on time frame, if you can. If you need more time, that's fine as

MR. HENRETTY: Your Honor, this is Lyle Henretty. I obviously have to talk to the two individuals again about this given time. I think, you know, certainly we could get this done by mid January given my schedule and, you know, we have a lot going on right now but that would be what I would

And then also, just sort of a request, given -- you know, it seems like similar what happened with the *Brown* case, I would ask that these depositions be limited in time from the seven hours down to, I think Judge Pallmeyer

ordered, three hours.

THE COURT:

did think that all th

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THE COURT: Okay. I did read the transcripts. I did think that all the questions that needed to be asked seemed to be done in three hours but let me throw it to the defendants now to talk about the time frame about getting this done by mid January along with the number of hours of the deposition. Defendant?

MR. MORAN: Judge, this is Pat Moran. I think mid January is fine. The only potential hiccup there is we are -- it appears all the press statements were not produced by the State's Attorney Office and the State's Attorney's Office has requested a subpoena from us and we need to confer with the plaintiffs' attorney to see if there's an objection to that. If there isn't, I don't think it would be -- it would be anything to delay this timeline that has been proposed. So I think January 15th, setting that aside, should be okay. Were you going to say something?

MR. HENRETTY: Me? No.

MR. MORAN: No. I heard a noise so I thought you were trying to interject.

MR. HENRETTY: No problem.

MR. MORAN: And then as for the time limit on the depositions, Judge, that wasn't requested in the motion for starters. I don't think it's particularly fair to throw it out now. But setting that aside as well, it doesn't look

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like these motions -- or these transcripts -- I'm sorry, the depositions would be completed in three hours. I think -you know, I'm not saying we definitely need a full seven hours but I also believe that this isn't an apples-to-apples comparison to the *Brown* case.

For starters, there's two claimants here, not one, and it seems to be more complicated because of that and there's different involvement between -- alleged involvement between Fulton and Coleman because -- so I think -- and different considerations between both of them. So I think a three-hour limitation I don't think is reasonable or warranted in this case. I think, you know, we should be allowed to just take a deposition consistent with the rules. We're not interested in prolonging depositions just for the sake of doing it so -- you know, and we've been able to handle, you know, privilege issues and things like that just fine. And the depositions that have gone thus far -- for example, we took the defense attorneys' depositions and when privileges were waived, there wasn't like extensive debate about that. So I think -- I think the three-hour limit is not something that should be imposed in this particular case.

THE COURT: Okay. So I'll tell you what I'm going I hear both of your arguments. At this time, I'm not going to impose any limitations. I'm going to trust that the defendants and the plaintiffs, who are experienced counsel

1 here, are going to move expeditiously through this -- these 2 depositions. I know there are two plaintiffs here and so 3 that's a factor. I know that the defendants have to cover 4 issues that may be associated with two plaintiffs and then you have two plaintiffs' counsel who may want to ask 5 11:10AM 6 questions at the end so at this time I'm not going to impose 7 any limitations. 8 I would suggest that if after the first deposition for some reason Respondents feel that their deposition was 9 10 not done expeditiously and was wasting time, you can come 11:11AM 11 back to me on a motion but you're all experienced counsel 12 here. The rules allow for a deposition of seven hours and I 13 don't see a basis here to limit it at this time for the 14 reasons I've stated. 15 Okay. So with respect to the time frame, I will 11:11AM order these depositions to be completed by January 15th of 16 17 2021. Okay. With that, Respondents, anything else at this 18 time? 19 MR. HENRETTY: This is Lyle Henretty. I don't believe so, your Honor. 20 11:11AM 21 THE COURT: Okay. Defendants, anything else? 22 Not from the defendant police officers. MR. MORAN: 23 COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry. This is the court 24 reporter. Who was that? 25 MR. MORAN: I'm sorry. This is Pat Moran for that. 11:12AM

	1	THE COURT: Okay. City of Chicago?	
	2	MS. MEADOR: Lisa Meador. No, no other issues.	
	3	Thank you, your Honor.	
	4	THE COURT: Okay. For Mr. Fulton?	
11:12AM	5	MR. CURRAN: No excuse me. No, your Honor.	
	6	THE COURT: Okay. And that was Mr	
	7	MR. CURRAN: I apologize. Nicholas Curran on	
	8	behalf of Plaintiff Fulton.	
	9	THE COURT: That's okay. And Mr. Coleman?	
11:12AM	10	MR. AINSWORTH: This is Russell Ainsworth. Nothing	
	11	from Mr. Coleman.	
	12	THE COURT: Okay. Thank you all for your time.	
	13	Everyone have a good weekend. We're adjourned.	
	14	(Proceedings concluded at 11:12 a.m.)	
11:14AM	15		
	16	<u>CERTIFICATE</u>	
	17	I hereby certify that the foregoing is a telephonic	
	18	transcript of proceedings before the Honorable Sunil R.	
	19	Harjani on December 4, 2020.	
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	22	/s/Laura LaCien December 7, 2020	
	23	Official Court Reporter DATE	
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